Comparative Economics: Responses to the Assurance Game in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans Using Equivalent Procedures by Brosnan, Sarah F. et al.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Psychology Faculty Publications Department of Psychology
2011
Comparative Economics: Responses to the
Assurance Game in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans
Using Equivalent Procedures
Sarah F. Brosnan
Georgia State University, sbrosnan@gsu.edu
Audrey Parrish
Michael J. Beran
Georgia State University, mberan1@gsu.edu
Timothy Flemming
Lisa Heimbauer
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_facpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Psychology at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brosnan, S.F., Parrish, A., Beran, M.J., Flemming, T., Heimbauer, L., Talbot, C.F., Lambeth, S.P., Schapiro, S.J., Wilson, B.J. (2011).
Responses to the assurance game in monkeys, apes, and humans using equivalent procedures. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 10(8), 3442-3447. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1016269108
Authors
Sarah F. Brosnan, Audrey Parrish, Michael J. Beran, Timothy Flemming, Lisa Heimbauer, Catherine Talbot,
Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro, and Bart J. Wilson
This article is available at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_facpub/56
Comparative economics: Responses to the Assurance game in monkeys, apes, and 
humans using equivalent procedures 
 
Sarah F. Brosnan1,2,3,4, Audrey Parrish1,2, Michael J. Beran1,2, Timothy Flemming1,2, Lisa 
Heimbauer1,2, Catherine Talbot1,2, Susan P. Lambeth4, Steven J. Schapiro4, & Bart J. 
Wilson5 
 
1Language Research Center, Georgia State University 
2Department of Psychology, Georgia State University 
3Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University 
4Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research, UT MD Anderson 
Cancer Center 
5Economic Science Institute, Chapman University 
 
 
Corresponding Authors: 
SFB: Georgia State University, PO Box 5010, Atlanta, GA 30302, phone: 404.413.6301, 
email: sbrosnan@gsu.edu 
MJB: Georgia State University, PO Box 5010, Atlanta, GA 30302, phone: 404.413.5285, 
email: mjberan@yahoo.com 
BJW: Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, phone: 
714.628.7306, email: bartwilson@gmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
 There is great interest in the evolution of economic behavior. In typical studies, 
species are asked to play one of a series of economic games, derived from game theory, 
and their responses are compared. The advantage of this approach is the relative level of 
consistency and control that emerges from the games themselves; however in the typical 
experiment, procedures and conditions differ widely, particularly between humans and 
other species. Thus, in the current study we investigated how three primate species, 
capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, played the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) 
Game using procedures which were, to the best of our ability, the same across species, 
particularly with respect to training and pre-testing. Our goal was to determine what, if 
any, differences existed in the ways in which these species made decisions in this game. 
We hypothesized differences along phylogenetic lines, which we found. However, the 
species were more similar than might be expected. In particular, humans who played 
using ‘non-human primate-friendly’ rules did not behave as is typical. Thus, we find 
evidence for similarity in decision-making processes across the Order Primates. These 
results indicate that such comparative studies are possible and moreover that in any 
comparison rating species’ relative abilities, extreme care must be taken in ensuring that 
one species does not have an advantage over the others due to methodological 
procedures. 
\body 
Introduction 
 Recent advances in the study of economic decision-making have fundamentally 
altered how we view the science of economics. Beginning with experimental economics 
(1), and continuing in more recently emerging fields, such as neuroeconomics (2, 3), 
there has been a much more scientific approach to understanding how humans make 
decisions in economic contexts. Most recently, there has emerged an interest in 
understanding the evolution of human decision making, primarily as studied using a 
comparative approach. Although studies of rats and pigeons emerged many decades ago, 
a recent surge with additional species has provided even more data relevant to social 
scientists interested in decision making.  
Although game theory has been used independently in behavioral ecology for 
decades (4), it is only recently that human economic games have been used extensively to 
address decision-making behavior (5, 6) and underlying neural activity (7). There are 
certainly reasons to think that humans and other primates might be similar in their 
decision-making abilities. Other primates are our closest living relatives - we share a 
common ancestor with chimpanzees within approximately the last 6 million years (8) – 
so there is a high likelihood of homology. Even though this does not mean identical 
decision making, it implies similarity in the underlying structures. Non-human primates 
also show many of the same cognitive skills, and even biases (9, 10), as humans. 
Alternately though, humans are distinct from other primates, and even a few million 
years is sufficient for substantial evolutionary divergence. In fact, despite the use of non-
human primate models as a means of understanding human cognitive evolution, some 
studies have indicated differences between us (6, 11), and there remains a sense that 
humans are the exceptional primate (12, 13). 
An often overlooked aspect of this debate, though, is inconsistent methodology. 
At the most basic level, procedural differences, such as in timing, reward and 
experimental environment, may make a difference in outcomes and imply species 
differences that do not necessarily exist (14). More critically, there are typically 
fundamental differences in procedure and format that often advantage humans. Humans 
can be verbally instructed on constraints, rules, and contingencies; presented with payoff 
matrices; and given pre-tests to verify understanding. Animals cannot. Instead, they must 
be trained, and investigators must infer when individuals across species possess an 
apparently equivalent understanding of the task. Given the differences in procedure, 
however, this cannot be assumed any more than can evolutionary homology. Thus, the 
purpose of our study was to provide a comparison that was as procedurally similar as 
possible across three species frequently used in studies of cooperation. Our goal was to 
create as fair a playing field for this cross-species assessment as possible and to see 
whether previously reported differences remained. 
Different disciplines define cooperation differently, so it is important to clarify 
what we mean in this case. We define cooperation as a situation in which two individuals 
can increase their immediate payoffs by working together. This definition emphasizes the 
behaviors of the individuals involved, as measured by their decisions and the pairs’ 
outcomes. Thus, our focus is on what the individual gains from the behavior (i.e., the 
proximate payoff to their decision making), rather than whether the individual 
understands their behavior (i.e., the cognitive or neural mechanisms underlying their 
decision). This evolutionary perspective differs from both psychology and economics, 
which tend to have a more mechanistic focus. However, it allows for a direct comparison 
without assuming cognitive complexity that may not be required (15), or reliance on self-
report, which may be unreliable (16).  
Of course, testing multiple species with additional paradigms is not sufficient; it is 
also critical that all species have some ability in the chosen task. Otherwise apparent 
differences in ability may be instead due to differences in aptitude to the specific task. 
Even among closely related species, differences in ecology may lead to selection for quite 
different skills (17). We tested capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, three 
species that show a strong tendency to cooperate across multiple domains and have 
demonstrated an ability to extrapolate these skills to experimental tasks in the laboratory 
(18, 19, 20; see SOM for additional detail).  
We used the Assurance game, in which each individual must choose whether to 
coordinate for a large reward that they only receive if their partner also takes the same 
action. We chose this game because it is simple in that there are two symmetric strategies 
that result in two Nash equilibria, one risk-dominant and the other payoff-dominant. The 
strategy in the risk-dominant equilibrium generates a sure payoff regardless of what the 
partner does. The strategy in the payoff-dominant equilibrium, if both partners play it, 
generates a payoff that strictly dominates the risk-dominant payoff. In other words, in the 
payoff-dominant strategy, both individuals’ objectives are aligned.  
The goal of this study was to provide the first multi-species comparison of an 
interdependent game when the task was presented using nearly identical methodology in 
a nearly identical experimental environment to all species. We designed the procedure to 
be particularly amenable to non-human primates, but also of sufficient interest to allow 
for human use. Note that by designing the study first for non-human primates and then 
adapting it for humans, we reversed the typical procedure. We paid careful attention to 
the details, including potentially ‘irrelevant’ features, such as the mechanism by which 
payoffs were delivered and the previous experience of the participants. This made the 
tasks as similar as possible, given the obvious differences among the species in terms of 
their housing and lifestyles. We hypothesized that we would find differences in game 
play, with humans outperforming the other two species, based on humans’ more 
developed cognitive abilities and increased cooperative tendencies. We did not have a 
directional prediction for the two non-human primates; chimpanzees are more closely 
related to humans (8), but capuchin monkeys have a similar brain-to-body ratio (21) and 
are known to be highly cooperative (see details above). We also predicted that the 
differences we found might be minimized in comparison to other studies due to the more 
similar procedures employed in the current experiment. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 The Assurance Game 
The game we used was a common game of coordination called the Assurance 
Game, sometimes referred to as the Stag Hunt game. This is a generic 2 x 2 game with 
the following constraints on the payoffs w > x ≥ z > y (see Table S1). This game has two 
pure strategy Nash equilibria: (Stag-Stag), which is the payoff-dominant equilibrium (e.g. 
that which maximized payoff to both individuals), and (Hare-Hare), which is the risk-
dominant equilibrium if x > z (e.g. that which minimizes risk to both individuals). This 
well-known coordination game is interesting to economists because strategic uncertainty 
plays a key role in the selection of the equilibrium, yet the players’ objectives are aligned 
(see 22 for a summary). In the Assurance game, the objectives may be the same (Stag, 
Stag), but the question of strategic interest is how sure a given player is that the other 
player will play Stag when he or she plays Stag. Evidence from coordination game 
experiments indicate that the payoff-dominant equilibrium is not a focal point with 
repeated interactions (as in 23), or with anonymous play with different individuals (as in 
24).1 
2.2 General Method 
We re-designed the typical, normal-form Assurance Game methodology 
specifically to work across species. Decisions were made by returning one of two tokens 
to an experimenter, one of which represented the Stag strategy and one of which 
represented the Hare strategy.2 For the procedure, each subject was given one of each 
token. Experimenters then solicited a token from the subject (see below for details for 
each species). When each participant had returned a single token of their choice, they 
were held up so that both subjects could see which tokens were returned by each 
individual. Then each subject received (or not) a reward dependent upon both what they 
returned and what their partner returned, following the payoff structure of the assurance 
experiment (payoffs were standardized throughout the following experiments). If the 
subject returned both tokens, they were presented again without comment and solicitation 
continued until a single token was returned. For rewards, non-human primates received 
                                                 
1 Though we should note that the former experiment involves more than two players with more than two 
potential actions, and the latter experiment uses a 3 x 3 coordination experiment. 
2 We use the word “strategy” to conform to the standard lexicon of game theory, which indicates a choice 
or decision, but makes no assumptions about the underlying cognitive processes or understanding which led 
to that decision. 
small pieces of preferred food rewards (fruit) and humans received money 
(quarters/dollar bills). The reward structure was such that mutual Stag play was the most 
beneficial (4 units), mutual Hare resulted in a low payoff (1 unit each), and the 
uncoordinated payoff of playing Stag when one’s partner plays Hare was unrewarded 
(however the partner that played Hare still got 1 unit).  
2.3 Novel components of experimental design and procedures 
The procedures explicitly incorporated a number of differences from the traditional 
normal form game to allow for direct comparison across species. First, no subject 
received any verbal instruction. The humans’ only instruction was limited to the 
following six points:  
1)  Have you participated in an economic experiment before? (Both must answer 
“yes” to participate. This was to verify that they had previous experience in this 
lab making decisions that led to rewarded outcomes.) 
2) In this experiment you will be using red and blue chips to make decisions behind 
a partition. 
3) As the experiment progresses you may be paid in quarters. 
4) Please collect the coins in the yellow cups provided. 
5) These are the only instructions you will receive in the experiment. Once the 
experiment begins, the experimenter will not be allowed to answer any questions 
until the experiment is over. 
6) Do you have any questions before the experiment begins? 
Second, no species received any pre-tests designed to assess task understanding. 
Thus all subjects, including humans, had to discover the payoff structure during the 
course of the game. However, since there were only two options, there were only four 
possible outcomes and the parameter space was limited and easy to explore. All species 
easily perform similar kinds of tasks with varied response strategies that must be retained 
in memory (e.g., conditional discrimination tasks).  
Third, all subjects, including humans, were paid in the actual currency (food or 
cash) on each trial, rather than rewards accumulating and being awarded at the end. This 
is a common procedure for non-human primates, and it is possible that the immediacy of 
obtaining the reward, rather than seeing a number accumulate, alters responses. While we 
cannot verify that these rewards have equivalent subjective value for each species, or 
indeed, for each individual within a species, we chose rewards that are highly valued in 
such testing situations. Humans’ decisions ranged from $0 to $1 for each round, so each 
decision was valuable and they had the opportunity for a large payoff ($40 + $7 show-up 
payment for 10-15 minutes of participation, or $0.50 to $2 per minute). In addition, the 
use of qualitatively different rewards does not substantively impact human or non-
humans’ choice behavior (25). 
Finally, all subjects sat immediately next to their partner, again common in non-
human primate, but not human, studies. This had two direct impacts on the study. First, 
subjects were not anonymous, and it was clear that they were playing together without 
having been told this. The lack of anonymity enhances the likelihood of achieving the 
Pareto dominant outcome. Second, subjects had the capability to communicate with each 
other to whatever degree they were able to, given their species. This might include direct 
communication, including vocalizations, gestures, and, in humans, speaking (only two 
pairs of 26 human pairs spoke), or indirect communication, including unconsciously 
communicating their intentions through body posture, facial expression, or gesture, 
behaviors that humans are known to utilize (26, 27). 
2.3.1 Non-human primates 
All non-human primates were socially housed in multi-male, multi-female social 
arrangements with extensive indoor and outdoor living space complete with 
environmental enrichment. For details on species’ housing, see SOM. Nonhuman 
primates received 30 trials per session, excepting the LRC chimpanzees, who tended to 
lose interest and so received 20 trials per session. All test sessions were videotaped for 
later analysis.  
Although in a typical Assurance Game choices are made simultaneously (or 
functionally simultaneously), we were unable to separate some individuals in such a way 
that they could see each other and not the tokens. Thus, we initially tested all non-human 
primates without a visual barrier, and hid the tokens as they were returned. Nonetheless, 
subjects may have been able to view what the other subject was doing while, or before, 
making their own choice, meaning that they might have been playing an extensive form 
game (see below for details). Our plan was to then incorporate a divider and see if the 
animals’ behavior remained the same. However, given the results, this option was 
pursued in only one group of chimpanzees (see below for details).  
 2.3.1.1 Capuchin monkeys Capuchin monkeys lived at the Language Research 
Center of Georgia State University (hereafter LRC) in two multi-male, multi-female 
social groups of 5-8 individuals with offspring present (2M, 2F subjects from one group 
and 3M, 1F from the other). 
 2.3.1.2 Chimpanzees, MD Anderson Subjects included 20 chimpanzees housed in 
social groups at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research 
of The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Bastrop, TX, USA (hereafter 
MDA). There were two changes to the protocol from the capuchins. First, the 
chimpanzees could not be separated, so to keep them from stealing each other’s tokens, 
we used “T” shaped PVC pipes that could be placed through the mesh of the caging, but 
were held in place by the top of the T. Second, we used two experimenters, one for each 
ape, as it was difficult for one experimenter to interact with both subjects simultaneously. 
The experimenters simultaneously provided each chimpanzee with one of each token and, 
after both subjects had returned their tokens, the experimenters simultaneously held them 
both up and proceeded to give the appropriate rewards. Neither experimenter was aware 
of what token the other chimpanzee returned to the other experimenter, and therefore the 
potential for cuing a given response was minimized. 
 2.3.1.3 Chimpanzees, Language Research Center We tested four additional 
chimpanzees (2M, 2F) who lived at the LRC. The experimental procedure at the LRC 
was identical to that at MDA, except that the chimpanzees were separated into different 
cages for testing. There was additional testing for two pairs that chose the payoff-
dominant outcome (Stag-Stag). For the first test, we added a partition to block their view 
of the other’s choice (all other procedures were identical). This partition extended only up 
to the chimpanzees’ shoulder height, so that they could identify each other, and extended 
approximately 18 inches in front of the caging, to eliminate the possibility that they saw 
what the experimenter accepted. Since the T shaped tokens could not be moved in such a 
way that their partner could see them, the game was functionally simultaneous. The 
second test was identical to the barrier procedure, but used two new tokens, a purple 
token (Stag) and a green token (Hare), to see if they could extrapolate their behavior to 
novel tokens used in the same game. This allowed us to verify that any consistencies in 
behavior between the original and barrier tests were due to active choices rather than 
established preferences for one or the other token. 
2.3.2 Humans 
Fifty-two undergraduate subjects were recruited from the general student body at 
Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA. Subjects were randomly recruited via an 
electronic email system and paid $7 for showing up on time, plus what they earned in the 
experiment. Each subject had participated in at least one economic experiment prior to 
this session so that they had experience with receiving actual payment for their decisions 
in this laboratory. This was necessary for a direct comparison, as all non-human primates 
had previous experience making decisions during experiments to recieve food rewards. 
Accumulated coins and dollar bills were converted into large bills at the conclusion of the 
experiment. No subject participated in more than one pairing. 
Upon hearing the limited instructions listed above, the humans were seated in 
desk chairs next to one another in front of a 4' circular table. On the table was a T-shaped 
partition that horizontally separated the experimenter from the subjects, and prevented 
direct eye contact. The partition also vertically split the table into two halves, one for 
each subject. The partition separating the subjects did not extend to the edge of the table 
(it stopped approximately 4” from the edge) so that they could comfortably make eye 
contact with each other (as could the non-human primates). Subjects could have leaned 
around to watch each other submit their token, but video analysis revealed that none did 
so.  
The barrier separating the subjects from the experimenter had a 2" x 5.5" slot at the 
bottom of each side through which the experimenter slid the two tokens (one red and one 
blue poker chip) at the beginning of each trial. The experimenter also passed their 
earnings through this slot at the end of each trial. At the top, the partition also included a 
1" x 5" slot for each subject, outlined in green, through which they could submit tokens. 
The experimenter held a ceramic bowl under each slot to collect the tokens, which 
allowed the subjects to hear whether their counterpart had made a decision. After 
receiving a single token from each subject, the experimenter held up the tokens above the 
barrier, with each token in front of the subject who submitted it. He then put down the 
tokens, held up the appropriate payoff (quarter or dollar bill), or raised an open hand on 
that side if there was nothing, and then slid the token and payoff to the respective subject 
through the bottom slot of the barrier. If a subject slid two tokens through the green slot, 
the experimenter returned them both through the bottom slot (with no comment from the 
experimenter) until the subject returned a single token. If a subject slid money through 
the slot, it was immediately returned to the subject through the bottom slot.  During no 
session did a subject try to talk to the experimenter. Due to the constraints of subject 
recruitment, humans received only a single session, so they were given 40 trials. 
Statistics 
 Pairs’ outcomes were compared to chance using chi-squared tests, including the 
Yates continuity correction for observations less than 40 (28). In cases in which there 
were fewer than five occurrences within a cell, the Fisher test was used instead, and when 
there were no occurrences in multiple cells, proportions were reported in lieu of statistics. 
In all cases, the unit of analysis was the pair. Note that these statistics are intended to 
determine whether that pair’s behavior differed from chance, not whether these results 
generalize to the species as a whole.  
In addition to comparing overall outcomes, we examined changes in individuals’ 
behavior that may have indicated a non-random strategy in making decisions (28). To do 
this, we first examined individuals’ choices using the binomial (proportions) test, to see 
whether there was an overall preference for either Stag or Hare choices. Second, we used 
the nonparametric runs test, which determines if the distribution of a series of binary 
events is random. A run is defined as a sequence within a series in which one of the two 
alternatives occurs on consecutive trials. The null hypothesis is that the series is 
generated randomly, i.e., there are neither too few nor too many runs. Finally, we used 
the nonparametric change-point test to determine if there was a change in the binomial 
process that generates a series of binary events. Note that the test does not assume a 
priori when a change occurred. The null hypothesis is that there is no change at any point 
in the sequence. All statistics were two-tailed and significance was at the p<0.05 level.  
Results 
Capuchin Monkeys 
 Among the six capuchin pairs, only one (16%) chose Stag-Stag more often than 
by chance (χ2=4.57, df=1, p<0.05; see Table 1). We also considered the possibility that 
the capuchins would perform better given extended opportunities to participate (although 
five of the eight individuals participated in more than one pair). Thus, we ran two pairs 
for additional sessions. After a total of 32 sessions, one of these pairs matched each 
other’s choice, but showed no preference for Stag-Stag or Hare-Hare (last 10 sessions: 
χ2=5.38, df=1, p<0.05).  
 Individual capuchins made non-random choices. One monkey preferred to return 
the Stag token (binomial test, p=0.024), five showed more or fewer runs than anticipated 
(all ps≤0.002), and two changed their decision-making strategy during game play 
(change-point test: ps<0.05). Among individuals tested in multiple pairings, some 
changed their behavior between partners. Two monkeys showed non-random behavior 
(as measured by the runs test) with one partner, but not the other.  
Chimpanzees 
 MD Anderson: Eight of the 10 pairs’ choices deviated from chance. Six pairs 
‘matched’, with both partners choosing the same token (all χ2>27.69, df=1, all p<0.001). 
However, none of these pairs preferentially chose either the Stag-Stag or the Hare-Hare 
options, despite extensive experience with both payoffs. Both of the remaining pairs were 
more likely to choose the option opposite to what their partner chose (e.g. Stag-Hare or 
Hare-Stag: χ2=6.25, df=1, p<0.05; χ2=183.05, df=1, p<0.001).  
The above analyses were done using the entire data set of 20 sessions. To more 
directly compare the chimpanzees to the capuchin monkeys, we repeated the analysis 
using only the first 10 sessions each pair completed (partners did not switch). Five of the 
six pairs that matched across 20 sessions were doing so already in the first 10 sessions 
(all χ2>4.39, df=1, p<0.05). Of the two subjects that chose oppositely from their partner, 
one did so in the first 10 sessions (χ2=17.25, df=1, p<0.001). Remaining analyses are 
done on all 20 sessions to include as much data as possible. 
The matching outcomes seen in six pairs could emerge in two contexts. First, one 
partner may have ‘understood’ the task and matched (or not) their partner’s choice. 
Second, both individuals may have understood the need to match, but failed to recognize 
that one outcome provided higher payoffs than the other. Thus, we investigated the 
frequency with which one individual spontaneously made the first choice among all 10 
pairs (we decided to record these data after commencing the study, so we have data on all 
20 sessions for 6 pairs and the last 15, 14, 11, and 10 sessions, respectively, for the 
remaining pairs). In six of the 10 pairs, one individual was more likely to make the first 
move than the other (binomial tests, all ps≤0.003). In four of these cases, the pair 
matched and in one case the pair played oppositely. Looking at it another way, among the 
pairs that matched, in four of them (66.7%) one subject typically went first. Among the 
pairs that chose oppositely, in one of them (50%) one subject typically went first. Finally, 
among the two pairs that showed no consistent response, in one pair (50%) one of them 
typically went first. Thus, there is no evidence that a spontaneous consistent order to 
sequential play affected outcomes.  
Only four subjects of the 20 showed a preference for one token over the other 
(binomial test, all ps<0.05). These four apes either matched (n=3) or played oppositely 
(n=1) to their partner. All 20 chimpanzees showed more runs than anticipated (runs test: 
all ps<0.001). Five of the 20 chimpanzees switched strategies more than 500 times in 600 
trials, possibly indicating a side bias. No chimpanzee changed their decision-making 
strategy during the game (change-point test, all subjects NS). 
 Language Research Center: Four pairs of subjects were initially tested. Of these, 
two pairs preferentially choose the Stag-Stag option (χ2=23.79, df=1, p<0.001; 97% 
preference for Stag-Stag, no statistic calculated due to empty cells). Of the remaining two 
pairs, one failed to settle on a strategy (χ2=0.16, df=1, p>0.05). The other preferred Stag 
(χ2=24.61, df=1, p<0.001), but due to the female choosing Stag predominantly, while the 
male chose randomly. Thus, we performed additional testing only on the two pairs that 
showed a robust preference for the Stag-Stag option. 
To test whether the subjects understood the game or were visually matching their 
partners, we erected a barrier between the individuals so that they could not see their 
partners’ choice (see Methods). One pair continued choosing the payoff-dominant 
outcome (99% preference for Stag-Stag), while the other did not (χ2=0.05, df=1, p>0.05), 
although the male in the latter pair chose Stag more than Hare (binomial test, p<0.001). 
However, when novel tokens were introduced, both pairs were more likely to play Stag-
Stag than any other option (χ2=78.2, df=1, p<0.001; χ2=62.6, df=1, p<0.05), although 
again in the latter pair this appeared to emerge primarily because of the male’s preference 
for Stag (p<0.001). 
Considering their individual behavior, in the pair that always chose the payoff-
dominant outcome, both chimpanzees preferred Stag (binomial test, both ps<0.001) and 
showed fewer runs than anticipated, likely because of their preference for Stag. However, 
both showed more runs than anticipated on the novel token test (ps=0.002) and one did so 
on the barrier test (p=0.002), possibly because they were new situations. Both also 
showed a change in strategy in the novel token test (both ps<0.05), the test for which they 
initially showed the most Hare choices.  
Since these four chimpanzees played in multiple pairings, we were also able to 
investigate whether their behavior changed with different individuals. Only one 
chimpanzee, the one who showed the least evidence for non-random behavior, did not 
alter his behavior. The two individuals who showed the most evidence of understanding 
changed strategy in all conditions with their other partners, but only in the novel token 
condition with each other. The remaining female showed a change in behavior with one 
partner, but not the other.  
Humans 
 Among human subjects, five of the 26 pairs matched Stag-Stag on 75% or more 
of the trials (e.g. ≥ 30 of the 40 trials; an additional two pairs matched on 29 of 40 trials). 
Ten matched Hare-Hare, and 3 matched their partner, with an equal number of Stag-Stag 
and Hare-Hare choices. Intriguingly, eight of the 26 pairs (31%) never matched Stag-
Stag a single time, and all of these pairs preferentially matched Hare-Hare. Only one pair 
never matched Hare-Hare. Thus, humans who found Hare-Hare were less likely to 
explore alternate possibilities. 
 Of the 52 participants, all but seven showed significant preferences for one token 
over the other over the course of the 20 trials (binomial test, all ps<0.05). Twenty 
participants more often chose the Hare option while 25 more often chose Stag. For the 
seven participants that showed no preference, four participants showed more or fewer 
runs than anticipated (ps<0.05; two additional subjects showed a non-significant trend in 
this direction; p≤0.10).Twenty subjects showed no change in the decision making process 
(change-point test; ps>0.05). Fourteen of these preferred the Stag option throughout (thus 
56% of those who preferred Stag did so from the beginning) while three chose Hare 
throughout. In the final three cases, the subjects never settled on a strategy. Thus, the 
majority of subjects (49 of 52) showed non-random behavior.   
Discussion  
 We found that while there were differences in the degree to which each species 
could achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, there was continuity in behavior across 
species. Specifically, there was a phylogenetic ordering with respect to the primates’ 
decision outcomes, with more efficient, payoff-dominant outcomes achieved more 
frequently in human pairs than in those of other species, and with chimpanzees doing so 
more frequently than capuchins. However, when procedures were equalized, only a 
subset of humans achieved these efficient outcomes, and pairs of both other species did 
so as well. Thus, when tested in similar conditions, other primates reached similar 
behavioral outcomes to humans more often than might have been expected based on the 
typical normal-form economics experiment. Consequently, we found support for both of 
our predictions, and potentially evidence of evolutionary continuity in decision-making. 
Considering this in more detail, the capuchin monkeys, who are phylogenetically 
most distant from humans, showed the least structured behavior. Only one pair chose 
Stag-Stag more often than chance, and only five of the eight subjects demonstrated 
behavior that indicated non-random choice behavior. Note, too, that despite statistical 
significance, the pair that achieved the payoff-dominant outcome did so less frequently 
than the chimpanzees and humans who found the same outcome. Chimpanzees were 
intermediate, and the most frequent strategy was unanticipated. Although only two pairs 
of chimpanzees consistently reached the payoff-dominant outcome (see below for more 
details), the majority matched their partner. This strategy leads to rewards for each 
individual on each trial, yet Hare-Hare was not as efficient as Stag-Stag. It is not clear 
why they did not alter their behavior. However, the fact that the dominant strategy 
seemed positional (they showed a side bias in their choices, a common behavior in 
primates) may indicate that despite finding a solution, they did not attend to the 
interaction in the same way as did the humans. Finally, despite being the species for 
which the highest frequency of pairs achieved the payoff-dominant outcome, even among 
humans fewer than 20% of pairs did so (this increases to 27% if two borderline pairs are 
included). An additional 38% of pairs achieved the risk-dominant outcome (Hare-Hare), 
and 12% matched their partner. It is worth reiterating that despite humans’ success as 
compared to the other primates, a nontrivial proportion of the pairs failed to achieve the 
payoff-dominant outcome. This underscores the difficulty of finding outcomes when the 
typical human procedures (instructions, payoff matrices, pre-tests for understanding) are 
absent, common handicaps for non-human species. Nonetheless, even when the field is 
leveled, humans are more likely than other primates to achieve these most efficient 
outcomes.  
With respect to the chimpanzees, it is interesting, although not diagnostic with 
only a single pair, that the pairs that achieved the most efficient outcome even in a 
functionally simultaneous design (e.g. the barrier condition) with novel tokens had a 
substantially different rearing history. They were cognitively enriched from infancy and 
are accustomed to these kinds of interactive tasks. The one who subjectively seemed to 
understand it first had previous experience exchanging with a partner to obtain tools (29), 
and this particular pair was the most successful in a recent barter task requiring them to 
exchange tokens with each other (30). It may be that previous experiences had led this 
pair to expect that interaction with the partner and the experimenter could provide 
rewards. These chimpanzees also may be more like humans in how they perceive these 
kinds of tasks, for instance understanding it as an opportunity for rewards in a way the 
others do not, or perhaps even enhancing their interest in the task. Thus some 
chimpanzees can achieve maximizing outcomes in economic games that are equivalent to 
those of humans, yet they may require specialized background experience to do so (31). 
Such variation also reinforces the need to, whenever possible, test a large number of 
primates with varied backgrounds (e.g. multi-facility collaborations) to fully unearth the 
extent of their abilities and the extent of intra-specific variation within each species.  
Although in most cases subjects played only with one other individual, in several 
cases with chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys we were able to re-pair individuals with 
more than one partner. Interestingly, in some of these cases, we found differences in 
behavior amongst different partners. Among capuchins, two of the three individuals 
tested with multiple partners behaved differently with different partners, and three of the 
four LRC chimpanzees did the same. These data do not allow us to determine which 
feature was important in changing the primates’ behavior (e.g. relationships, the different 
distribution of choices amongst different partners), but the fact that they were present 
indicates sensitivity to the changing conditions created by playing with a new partner. 
Although similar data are not available for humans, we anticipate that this would also be 
the case with them. 
What leads to the underlying similarity in decision outcomes between humans and 
other species? A first hypothesis is that there is similarity in the underlying decision-
making architecture across the primates. This would indicate that while humans may 
possess additional traits which allow more complex problems to be solved, such as 
narrative language, these additions support, but do not fundamentally alter, our basic 
primate decision structures. In fact, while all three species have large brain-to-body ratios 
and cooperate extensively in both natural and laboratory conditions, the species’ 
ecologies are consistent with our results. Humans live in an environment with ample 
opportunities to coordinate, particularly among out-group members, which might have 
led to selection on enhanced tendencies to do so beyond that seen in other species. 
Chimpanzees also coordinate to a greater degree than capuchins, for instance taking 
complementary roles in group hunts (32). These ecological differences may have 
increased selection pressure differentially across species, leading to differences in degree, 
if not kind, in decision-making. The similarity of the cognitively enriched chimpanzees, 
whose rearing history and behavior were both similar to humans’, supports this 
contention. 
However, there are alternative explanations. In particular, this hypothesis fails to 
explain humans’ unexpectedly low level of success in the current game. This is difficult 
to explain by motivation, as rewards were quite high (approximately $0.50 to $2 per 
minute). In interpreting our results we note that our procedures differed nontrivially from 
the traditional study of strategic behavior of humans in the laboratory. Providing common 
information on all the payoff contingencies is simply not feasible for non-human 
primates, but the human cognitive ability to internalize the interdependency of the 
payoffs may be key for distinguishing human performance in this game from non-human 
primate performance. In ongoing research we are implementing this game with 
computerized interactions, and for humans we are comparing results from the 'primate 
format' to those which more closely follow traditional normal form game format. 
Having considered the similarities, it is interesting to speculate on the differences 
in behavior among the three primates. Although we equalized many aspects of the 
experimental design, we were not able to do so for all factors. One of these may have 
influenced results. We were able to test all individuals, including humans, in a setting in 
which only that pair and the experimenter were present. Moreover, all had previous 
experience in the lab in which they were tested, all rewards were paid out in the actual 
currency (cash or fruit) by the experimenter on a trial-by-trial basis, no pairings were 
anonymous, and all subjects of all species lived day-to-day in multi-male, multi-female 
social groups. Nonetheless, only humans were tested with strangers (unfamiliar primates 
do not peacefully interact) and humans used a partition which blocked their view of their 
partners’ choice. While we do not know whether the primates made use of their ability to 
see their partners’ rewards, they may have done so (excepting the LRC chimpanzees 
tested with the barrier). Finally, contrary to most such comparisons, this game was 
designed for non-humans and adapted to humans, which may have made the task unusual 
for humans. All of these differences should have made the task more difficult for humans, 
if anything minimizing the difference between humans and other primates.  
Differences in behavior may reflect less about strategic decision-making and more 
about how each species comes to understand the nature of the task. Although humans 
faced challenges in this particular task, non-human primates, too, may need different 
procedures or additional time and experience in order to come to understand the 
contingencies of the task. Thus, as with the humans, their responses may say more about 
their ability to understand the experimental procedure (or the underlying structure of the 
task) than whether they can coordinate responses to maximize reward. Second, species 
may reach the same functional outcome using different mechanisms. For instance, the 
simplest explanation for matching behavior when partners can see each others’ responses 
is visual matching, which would functionally result in successful coordination and, hence, 
reward maximization. However humans and some chimpanzees matched without 
observing their partners’ outcomes. Moreover the fact that humans can utilize more 
advanced understanding of the tasks does not necessarily mean that they do so. These 
differences should be investigated through replication, particularly those involving 
different formats (e.g., on computerized tasks, for which all species have shown 
comparable abilities in other kinds of cognitive tests). With additional experience or 
procedures, we expect that more pairs of each of these species, but in particular the non-
humans, might show coordinated behavior. These kinds of manipulations in future 
studies will better illustrate the nature of the species differences reported here, and will 
clarify how coordination behavior can emerge.  
We find that when conditions are held as similar as possible, humans outperform 
other primates in finding maximizing solutions to a non-contingent economic game, but 
the differences in performance are not as great as might be anticipated. Rather, 
individuals in all species may find efficient outcomes, and the difference lies in the 
proportion of pairs within a species that do so. These results provide initial evidence that, 
as with other behaviors, humans’ behavior in cooperative economic games may be part of 
an evolutionary continuum in which our decision-making strategies emerged from those 
of our common ancestors. Nonetheless, humans are superior at coordination as compared 
to other species, a fact that may be due to other sorts of behaviors, such as narrative 
language, and cognitive capacities that have emerged in the interim. 
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Table Legends 
 
Table 1: Frequencies of different strategies across species.   
 Numbers in parenthesis beside species indicate the number of pairs. LRC chimpanzees 
participated in three conditions (see Methods for details). Some non-human primates 
participated in greater than 10 sessions. For an equal comparison, results are reported 
from only the first 10 sessions first, and results considering all sessions tested are 
indicated in parentheses. Matching for the MDA Chimps includes two pairs which 
matched against their partner’s play. 
 
 No Strategy Matching Risk-dominant Payoff-dominant 
Capuchins (6) 5(4) 0(1) 0(0) 1(1) 
MDA Chimp (10) 2(4) 8(6) 0(0) 0(0) 
LRC Chimp (4) 2(1) 0(0) 0(0) 2(3) 
LRC Barrier (2) 1 0 0 1 
LRC Novel (2) 0 0 0 2 
Human (26) 8* 3 10 5 
 
*This includes 2 pairs who played the Payoff-dominant strategy on 29 trials of 40.  These 
two pairs are not included in the Payoff-dominant column. 
 
Supplemental Online Material 
Supplemental Introductory Material 
All three tested species show cooperative behavior in the laboratory and in the 
field.  Among capuchins, In mutualistic ‘bar-pull’ tasks in which individuals work 
together to obtain food rewards, capuchins both visually coordinate and understand the 
role of their partner (33). They also understand reward contingencies. They are reciprocal 
(34), and do not cooperate when one member of the pair can dominate the rewards (35) 
or when their partners do not equitably share outcomes (36). Notably, cooperation occurs 
only when the monkeys understand the task (37), underscoring the importance of 
appropriate methodology. In the wild, monkeys collaborate (38) and may even hunt 
together (39).  
Chimpanzees are similarly skilled at cooperation. In similar bar-pull tasks, 
chimpanzees cooperate at higher levels when paired with tolerant partners than with those 
who do not share (40), and actively choose tolerant partners when given the option (19). 
In the field, chimpanzees collaborate on group hunts, even taking complementary roles 
(41). They also exchange goods and services reciprocally (42, 43) and engage in 
coalitions and alliances (44, 45).  
Humans are the most cooperative species. In laboratory settings, humans routinely 
achieve mutual gains in payoffs through trust and reciprocity by outperforming the 
rational predictions of game theory, even when the game is only played once, and with an 
anonymous stranger (for a summary, see 18). Human cooperation includes similar 
activities as the other two primates, including cooperative hunting of game and 
subsequent food sharing (e.g. 46). 
Supplemental Methods 
1.  Non-human primates 
All species received a combination of primate chow, fruits, and vegetables, as well as 
additional enrichment foods. No individual was ever food or water deprived for testing. 
Subjects were adults who lived in the same social group and, when possible, multiple 
pairings within the same social group were tested. Pairs were separated from the 
remainder of the social group into their indoor dens (chimpanzees) or their testing cage 
located in the indoor colony room (capuchins) to limit distractions during testing. All 
separation was voluntary (i.e., subjects were only tested if they entered the testing area 
freely). 
For testing, the experimenter then held out one hand in a stereotypical “begging gesture” 
to request the return of a token. When a subject returned a token, the experimenter closed 
her hand over it (capuchins) or placed it behind her back (chimpanzees). After both 
subjects had returned their tokens, the experimenter held them up, with the token each 
subject returned in front of them. Experimenters then added the food rewards (if any) to 
their hand and held up the food rewards, with the tokens, for each subject. After the 
subjects took the food rewards, the next trial commenced. Tokens were PVC pipes 
painted either red (Stag) or blue (Hare). PVC pipes were sized appropriately for the 
species to easily manipulate. 
1.1 Capuchin monkeys 
In pilot testing with a single pair there was no change in either individual’s behavior (i.e., 
both subjects chose randomly between the tokens). Thus we conducted the experiment 
with one white token (Hare) and one black and white patterned token (Stag) to eliminate 
the possibility that the capuchins could not distinguish between the colors (although see 
47).  
1.2 MDA Chimpanzees 
Due to the large number of available subjects, each of the 20 subjects was used in only a 
single pair. A subset of chimpanzees required training in token exchange prior to the 
experiment, using standard procedures for training exchange (48). All training was done 
with a single token and invariant rewards to avoid the risk of inadvertently training a 
behavior; subjects learned the contingencies of the payoffs during the experiment. 
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